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Abstract
Using blockchain technology, it is possible to
create contracts that offer a reward in ex-
change for a trained machine learning model
for a particular data set. This would allow
users to train machine learning models for a
reward in a trustless manner.
The smart contract will use the blockchain to
automatically validate the solution, so there
would be no debate about whether the so-
lution was correct or not. Users who sub-
mit the solutions wont have counterparty risk
that they wont get paid for their work. Con-
tracts can be created easily by anyone with a
dataset, even programmatically by software
agents.
This creates a market where parties who
are good at solving machine learning prob-
lems can directly monetize their skillset, and
where any organization or software agent
that has a problem to solve with AI can so-
licit solutions from all over the world. This
will incentivize the creation of better machine
learning models, and make AI more accessi-
ble to companies and software agents.
A consequence of creating this market is
that there will be a well defined price of
GPU training for machine learning models.
Crypto-currency mining also uses GPUs in
many cases. We can envision a world where
at any given moment, miners can choose to
direct their hardware to work on whichever
workload is more profitable: cryptocurrency
mining, or machine learning training.
1. Background
1.1. Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies
Bitcoin was first introduced in 2008 to create a de-
centralized method of storing and transferring funds
from one account to another. It enforced ownership
using public key cryptography. Funds are stored in
various addresses, and anyone with the private key for
an address would be able to transfer funds from this
account. To create such a system in a decentralized
fashion required innovation on how to achieve con-
sensus between participants, which was solved using
a blockchain. This created an ecosystem that enabled
fast and trusted transactions between untrusted users.
Bitcoin implemented a scripting language for simple
tasks. This language wasnt designed to be turing
complete. Over time, people wanted to implement
more complicated programming tasks on blockchains.
Ethereum introduced a turing-complete language to
support a wider range of applications. This language
was designed to utilize the decentralized nature of the
blockchain. Essentially its an application layer on top
of the ethereum blockchain.
By having a more powerful, turing-complete program-
ming language, it became possible to build new types
of applications on top of the ethereum blockchain:
from escrow systems, minting new coins, decentral-
ized corporations, and more. The Ethereum whitepa-
per talks about creating decentralized marketplaces,
but focuses on things like identities and reputations to
facilitate these transactions. (Buterin, 2014) In this
marketplace, specifically for machine learning models,
trust is a required feature. This approach is distinctly
different than the trustless exchange system proposed
in this paper.
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1.2. Breakthrough in machine learning
In 2012, Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoff
Hinton were able to train a deep neural network for
image classification by utilizing GPUs. (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) Their submission for the Large Scale Vi-
sual Recognition Challenge (LSVRC) halved the best
error rate at the time. GPUs being able to do thou-
sands of matrix operations in parallel was the break-
through needed to train deep neural networks.
With more research, machine learning (ML) systems
have been able to surpass humans in many specific
problems. These systems are now better at: lip read-
ing (Chung et al., 2016), speech recognition (Xiong
et al., 2016), location tagging (Weyand et al., 2016),
playing Go (Silver et al., 2016), image classification
(He et al., 2015), and more.
In ML, a variety of models and approaches are used to
attack different types of problems. Such an approach
is called a Neural Network (NN). Neural Networks are
made out of nodes, biases and weighted edges, and can
represent virtually any function. (Hornik, 1991)
Figure 1. Neural Network Schema
There are two steps in building a new machine learning
model. The first step is training, which takes in a
dataset as an input, and adjusts the model weights to
increase accuracy for the model. The second step is
testing, that uses an independent dataset for testing
the accuracy of the trained model. This second step
is necessary to validate the model and to prevent a
problem known as overfitting. An overfitted model
is very good at a particular dataset, but is bad at
generalizing for the given problem.
Once it has been trained, a ML model can be used to
perform tasks on new data, such as prediction, classi-
fication, and clustering.
There is a huge demand for machine learning models,
and companies that can get access to good machine
learning models stand to profit through improved ef-
ficiency and new capabilities. Since there is strong
demand for this kind of technology, and limited sup-
ply of talent, it makes sense to create a market for
machine learning models. Since machine learning is
purely software and training it doesnt require inter-
acting with any physical systems, using blockchain for
coordination between users, and using cryptocurrency
for payment is a natural choice.
2. Introduction
The ethereum white paper talks about on-chain de-
centralized marketplaces, using the identity and rep-
utation system as a base. It does not go into detail
regarding the implementation, but mentions a mar-
ketplace being built on top of concepts like identities
and reputations. (Buterin, 2014)
Here we introduce a new protocol on top of the
Ethereum blockchain, where identities and reputations
are not required to create a marketplace transaction.
This new protocol establishes a marketplace for ex-
changing machine learning models in an automated
and anonymous manner for participants.
The training and testing steps are done independently
to prevent issues such as overfitting. ML models are
verified and evaluated by running them in a forward
pass manner on the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Par-
ticipants using this protocol are not required to trust
each other. Trust is unnecessary because the protocol
enforces transactions using cryptographic verification.
3. Protocol
To demonstrate a transaction, a simple Neural Net-
work and forward pass capability is implemented to
showcase an example use case.
Basic structure:
1. Phase 1: User Alice submits a dataset, an eval-
uation function, and a reward amount to the
ethereum contract. The evaluation function takes
in a machine learning model, and outputs a score
indicating the quality of that model. The reward
is a monetary reward, typically denominated in
some cryptocurrency (eg- bitcoin or ether).
2. Phase 2: Users download the dataset submitted
by user Alice, and work independently to train a
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machine learning model that can represent that
data. When a user Bob succeeds in training a
model, he submits his solution to the blockchain.
3. Phase 3: At some future point, the blockchain
(possibly initiated by a user action) will evaluate
the models submitted by users using the evalua-
tion function, and select a winner of the competi-
tion.
Note: Some extra steps are necessary in each of the
phases in order to ensure trust and fairness of the com-
petition. Details to follow in section 3.
The DanKu (Daniel + Kurtulmus) protocol is pro-
posed to allow users to solicit machine learning models
for a reward in a trustless manner. The protocol has
5 stages to ensure a contract is executed successfully.
Figure 2. Initialization stage
Figure 3. Submission stage
Figure 4. Test dataset reveal stage
Figure 5. Evaluation stage
Figure 6. Finalize stage
3.1. Definitions
1. A user is defined by anyone who can interact with
ethereum contracts.
2. A DKC (DanKu Contract) is an Ethereum con-
tract that implements the DanKu protocol.
3. An organizer is defined by a user who creates the
DanKu contract.
4. A submitter is a user who submits solutions to
the DanKu contract in anticipation for a reward.
5. A period is a timeframe unit that is made up of
number of blocks mined.
6. A data point is made up of input(s) and predic-
tion(s).
7. A data group is a matrix made up of data points.
8. A hashed data group is the hash of a data group
that also includes a random nonce.
9. A contract wallet address is an escrow account
that holds the reward amount until the contract
is finalized.
The contract uses the following protocol:
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3.2. Contract Initialization Stage
An organizer has a problem they wish to solve (ex-
pressed as an evaluation function), datasets for testing
and training, and an Ethereum wallet.
1. Contract creation: The organizer creates a con-
tract with the following elements:
(a) A machine learning model definition. (a neu-
ral network is used in the demo)
(b) init1(), init2() and init3() functions.
(c) Function get training index() to receive
training indexes.
(d) Function get testing index() to receive train-
ing indexes.
(e) Function init3() for revealing the training
dataset to all users.
(f) Function submit model() for submitting so-
lutions to the contract.
(g) Function get submission id() for getting sub-
mission id.
(h) Function reveal test data() for revealing the
testing dataset to all users.
(i) Function get prediction() for running a for-
ward pass for a given model.
(j) Function evaluate model() for evaluating a
single model.
(k) Function cancel contract() for canceling
the contract before revealing the training
dataset.
(l) Function finalize contract() for paying out to
the best submission, or back to the organizer
if best model does not fulfill evaluation crite-
ria...
2. Init Step 1:
(a) Reward deposited in the contract wallet ad-
dress to payout winning solution.
(b) Maximum lengths of the submission, evalu-
ation and test reveal periods defined by the
height of the blocks.
(c) Hashed data groups.
3. Init Step 2: The organizer triggers the random-
ization function to generate the indexes for the
training and testing data groups. These indexes
are selected by using block hash numbers as the
seed for randomization.
4. Init Step 3: The organizer reveals the training
data groups and nonces by sending them to the
contract via the init3() function. The data is cryp-
tographically verified by the previously provided
hash values for the data groups.
At this point, the DanKu contract is initialized and the
training dataset is public. The submitters can down-
load the training dataset to start training their mod-
els. After successfully training they can submit their
solutions.
3.3. Solution Submission Stage
During this phase, any user can submit a potential
solution. This is the only period during which submis-
sions will be accepted.
1. Submitter(s) invoke the submit model() function,
providing a solution with the following elements:
(a) The solution weights and biases.
(b) The model definition.
(c) The payment address for payout.
3.4. Evaluation Stage
The evaluation stage can be initiated in one of two
ways:
1. The organizer calls the function reveal test data()
that reveals the testing dataset.
(a) In this case, the testing dataset will be used
for evaluation
2. The test reveal period has passed, but the orga-
nizer has not yet called reveal test data()
(a) Since the testing dataset is unavailable, the
training dataset will be used for evaluation
Once the evaluation stage begins, submissions will no
longer be accepted, and submitters may now begin
evaluating their models:
1. Submitter(s) call the evaluate model() function
with their submission id.
2. If the model passes the evaluation function, and
is better than the best model submitted so far (or
is the first model ever evaluated), it is marked as
the best model.
3.5. Post-Evaluation Stage
1. After the evaluation period ends, any user can
call the finalize contract() function to payout the
reward to the best model submitter.
2. If best model does not exist, reward is paid back
to the organizer.
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4. Incentives and Threat Models
The key to any marketplace is user trust. We need to
design a system where no user can cheat or gain advan-
tage over any other user. We must consider this from
the point of view of all involved parties: the organizer,
the submitters, and even the miners of the ethereum
blockchain.
We foresee several risks that need to be mitigated:
4.1. Overfitting by modeller
If the submitter has access to the testing dataset, they
can overfit their model to this dataset. This is a cardi-
nal sin in machine learning. The submitter can cheat
by training heavily on the test set, the downside being
that the model will not apply to more general prob-
lems.
The solution to this problem is to keep the testing
dataset secret until the submission period ends. In
our contract we require the organizer to come back
later and reveal the test set.
4.2. Test set manipulation by author
If the training and testing set do not draw from the
same input distribution, then the organizer can cheat
a modeller out of their fee. The organizer can pro-
vide fake testing data, and collect the model weights
without having to payout to the submitters.
The solution to this problem is to ensure that the orga-
nizer cannot pick and choose the training and testing
datasets. The organizer submits the hashes of the data
groups that represent the whole dataset. The DanKu
contract randomly selects a subset of that data that
the organizer is obligated to reveal later. Since the
hashes are deterministic, the validity of revealed data
groups can be verified. This prevents the organizer to
manipulate the training/testing dataset.
4.3. Organizer doesnt reveal the testing
dataset
For any given reason the organizer may not reveal the
testing dataset. This would prevent calling the evalua-
tion function and from paying out submitters for their
work in these situations.
To mitigate this issue, we give the organizer a certain
amount of time to reveal the testing dataset. If the
organizer fails to do so, the submitters can still trigger
the evaluation function on the training dataset instead.
Evaluating the models with the training dataset is far
from ideal, but its a required last resort so submit-
ters would get rewarded for their work in these rare
circumstances.
4.4. Too many submissions
In the ethereum network all transactions are executed
by miners. With every transaction, a fee is required
to compensate the miner for the executing and saving
it on the blockchain. This fee is called gas. Since each
block is mined every 12 seconds on average, it is not
practical to accept transactions that would take a long
time. Accepting these types of long transactions would
increase the risk of missing a block, and not being out-
mined by other miners. To mitigate this issue, miners
have their own self-imposed gas limits. If a transaction
uses more than the gas limit, it will fail regardless of
the amount being paid.
Originally the evaluation function was called by the
organizer, or submitter if the testing dataset was not
revealed. This evaluation function would evaluate all
submitted models. If the DanKu contract had too
many models to evaluate, the evaluation function was
at the risk of running out of gas due to existing gas
limits. At the time writing this, the average gas limit
was around 8 million. This would create a vulnerabil-
ity where the function caller can run out of gas pretty
quick, or can get rejected immediately due to the large
gas size not getting accepted at any nodes. This would
mean that the contract would never be finalized.
To mitigate this problem, we allow users to call the
evaluation function on any submitted model. This
prevents the too-many-submissions problem since the
evaluation function only runs on a single model at a
time. This also reduces the amount of total computa-
tion needed to evaluate the models. This would cre-
ate a situation where only the best model submitters
would be incentivized to call the evaluation function
on their own models.
Since evaluation can also be done offline, submitters
can evaluate each model locally to determine if their
model is indeed the best one or is in the top-n. It
might make sense to call the evaluation function on
your model if youre in the top-n, since there might be
a chance that the best model submitter might not call
the evaluation function on their model. In an ideal
situation this should not happen, but if it does, the
next best model submitter can also claim the prize if
it ever happens.
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4.5. Rainbow table attacks on hashed data
groups
Initially the sha-3-keccak was only hashing the data
group without a nonce. This made this hashing
method susceptible to rainbow table attacks from the
submitters.
One possible solution to this problem was to imple-
ment bcrypt, and use a salted hash instead. Password
hashing functions do work, but theyre computationally
more expensive. Instead we decided to add a nonce
to the end of the data group and hash it using sha3-
keccak instead.
This method prevents rainbow table attacks, and keeps
the gas cost at a lower price point.
There are probably other solutions to this problem,
including like scaling data points and adding noise.
This makes sense since real life data is rarely clean,
and mostly noisy.
4.6. Block hash manipulation by miners
Initially we were only using the last block hash as a
source of entropy for our randomization function. The
problem with this approach is a miner can influence
the resulting hash for a given block. This creates an
opportunity for the organizer to cheat as mentioned in
section 4.2. If theyre a miner, they can deploy their
contract right after mining a block. This doesnt guar-
antee that their contract will be initialized, but it gives
them some influence over the selection process for the
training and testing dataset.
Being a miner does not give you full control over how
the training selection process works. But it would
show you which data groups are going to be selected.
Due to this, the organizer can decide to not mine a spe-
cific block hash that could result in undesirable train-
ing indexes.
To minimize the influence of the attacker, we require
them to call init2() function within 5 blocks of call-
ing init1(). If they fail to do so, the contract will get
cancelled.
To read more about the implementation of hashing,
and the probability of getting favorable training in-
dexes, please refer to section 5.2.
4.7. Distributed reward system abuse
Depending on a selection criteria, the reward can be
claimed by the first submitter who fulfills the evalua-
tion criteria, the best model submitter or both. The
reward could even be distributed among top solutions
to incentivize more participation. The organizer has
full control over picking the selection criteria for their
DanKu contract.
A distributed reward system would be similar to
Ethereum’s proportionate mining reward for stale
blocks. A stale block is a solution to a block that is
propagated to the network too late. These blocks are
still rewarded to make sure miners still get paid for the
work they contribute, and to keep the network stable.
Only up to 7 stale blocks are rewarded. Stale blocks
can happen due to many reasons like outdated min-
ing software, and bad network connectivity. (Buterin,
2014)
A distributed reward system may de-incentivize sub-
mitters since a malicious submitter might resubmit the
same solution with minimum changes to solution to
steal the work of the original submitter. Due to this
reason, it makes sense to only payout to the best sub-
mitter. If there are two submissions with the same
solution, and this solution is the best one, the first
submitter will get paid out instead if theyre both eval-
uated. This is to prevent malicious submitters from
re-submitting the same solution and calling the evalu-
ation function before the original submitter.
The ideal situation would be where these models are
trained in pools, and the reward would be distributed
to members among a pool when a solution is found.
This would make collaboration and distributed re-
warding possible. Read more about pool mining in
section 7.1.
5. Implementation
5.1. Hashing the Dataset
The organizer breaks down the whole dataset into sev-
eral data groups. A nonce is a randomly generated
number that is only intended to be used once. Differ-
ence nonces are generated for each data group. Each
individual nonce is pushed to the end of the corre-
sponding data group.
The organizer hashes these data groups by passing
them to a hashing function. For the DanKu proto-
col sha3-keccak is chosen as the hashing function for
creating hashed data groups.
Ideally each data group is made up of 5 data points. If
there is 100 data points, that would make a total of 20
hashed data groups. This later allows the partitioning
of the dataset into training and testing datasets.
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5.2. Determining the Training Dataset
During Initialization step 2, the organizer calls the
init2() function. This function uses the previously
mined blocks hash numbers as a seed for randomiza-
tion. This function randomly selects the training and
testing groups. The default ratio is 80
The randomization function calculates the sha3-keccak
of the previous block’s hash number, and returns the
hexdigest. The modulo of the hexdigest is used to
randomly select an index. After selecting an index, we
decrement the modulo and repeat the previous step
until all training data group indexes are selected. The
initial modulo is the total number of data groups.
Algorithm (in solidity) for randomly selecting hashes:
1 function randomly_select_index(uint[]
array) private {
2 uint t_index = 0;
3 uint array_length = array.length;
4 uint block_i = 0;
5 // Randomly select training indexes
6 while(t_index < training_partition.
length) {
7 uint random_index = uint(sha256(block
.blockhash(block.number -block_i))
) % array_length;
8 training_partition[t_index] = array[
random_index ];
9 array[random_index] = array[
array_length -1];
10 array_length --;
11 block_i ++;
12 t_index ++;
13 }
14 t_index = 0;
15 while(t_index < testing_partition.
length) {
16 testing_partition[t_index] = array[
array_length -1];
17 array_length --;
18 t_index ++;
19 }
20 }
Lets call the number of data groups we have G. This
makes the probability of getting a favorable index 1G .
This index is selected by getting the modulo G of a
given block hash.
Lets call the training percentage as TP . The number
of training indexes are G× TP .
With every selected index, we decrease the modulo G
by 1 for selecting the next index. We iterate to
G× (1 − TP ) until we have selected all training
indexes.
Therefore, the probability of getting a unique
sequence of training indexes are
G∏
n=G×(1−TP )+1
1
n
A malicious organizer would not be only interested in
a sequence of training indexes. This is because any
permutation of those indexes would yield the same
training dataset. The permutation for the training
indexes are: (G× TP )!.
This makes the probability of getting ideal training
indexes: (G× TP )!×
G∏
n=G×(1−TP )+1
1
n
This probability can also be re-written as:
G∏
n=G×(1−TP )+1
G−n+1
n
Lets call the block limit L. After calling init1(), the
organizer has to call init2() within L blocks to limit
the influence they have over selecting the training
indexes. In the DanKu contract, a default of 5 blocks
is used, which should correspond to 1 minute on
average.
Ideally speaking for the organizer, lets assume that
the contract gets deployed immediately. This gives the
organizer L chances to call the init2() randomization
function after init1().
Hence, this makes the probability of getting ideal
training indexes within L blocks:
P = L×
G∏
n=G×(1−TP )+1
G−n+1
n .
For a training partition of 80% and a block limit of 5,
here are the chances of getting an ideal group of
training indexes for the following number of data
groups:
# of Data Groups G Ideal probability P
5 100%
10 11.11%
15 1.0989%
20 0.103199%
25 0.00941088%
30 0.00084207%
As seen in the table, the higher the number of data
groups are, the less likely a malicious organizer can
affect the outcome.
5.3. Forward Pass
A forward pass function is implemented for the given
machine learning model definition. For the scope of
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this paper, we only included a simple neural network
definition and a forward pass function. The general
idea is to demonstrate that it should be possible to
implement some if not most ML functions and models.
5.4. Evaluating the Dataset
Depending on the type of problem were trying to solve,
we can use metrics like accuracy, recall, precision, F1
score, etc. to evaluate the success of the given model.
Based on the scope and requirements, any one of these
metrics can be selected. An ideal scoring metric for
every classification problem doesnt exist. Every ML
problem should be evaluated within its own scope since
it can have sensitivity towards different metrics. (eg.
less tolerance towards false-negatives in cancer predic-
tion)
For demonstration purposes, we chose a simple ac-
curacy implementation for evaluating submitted solu-
tions.
5.5. Math Functions
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) doesnt have a
complete math library. It also does not support float-
ing point numbers. The absence of these functions
require to implement Machine Learning (ML) mod-
els using integer programming, fixed-point float point
numbers, and linear activation functions.
Certain activation functions used in ML models such
as sigmoid require functions such as exp(). These func-
tions also require some floating point constants such
as Euler’s number e. Both of these math features are
not implemented in EVM yet. Implementing them in
a contract would significantly increase the gas cost.
This makes non-linear type functions less desirable to
use in evaluating ML models. For this reason, weve
used ReLU instead of Sigmoid.
While implementing fixed float point numbers in solid-
ity we noticed that shift functions were implemented
with exponentiation functions, therefore theyre actu-
ally more expensive than using division.
In solidity the right shift x >> y is equivalent to x2y .
For division, this requires a lot more operations for
a simple division. Due to this fact, weve extensively
used division instead of shifting in fixed float point
calculations.
Overall, since the EVM is low level language, and does
not have a complete math library, most things needs to
be implemented from scratch to get ML models work-
ing.
5.6. Working Around Stack Too Deep Errors
Solidity only allows to use around 16 local variables in
a function. This includes function parameters and the
return variable too. Due to this restriction, complex
functions such as forward pass() needed to be divided
into several functions.
This required to use minimum number of local vari-
ables in functions. Due to this limit, in many places
variables were accessed directly instead of be referred
by more descriptive variables. This tradeoff was par-
tially mitigated by adding more explanatory com-
ments.
6. Miscellanea And Concerns
6.1. Complete anonymization of the Dataset
and Model Weights
Currently neither the dataset or model weights and
biases are anonymized. Any user can access the sub-
mitted models on DanKu contracts.
A possible way to solve this issue might be through
the use of homomorphic encryption. (Graepel et al.,
2013) One thing that stands out with homomorphic
encryption is the use of real numbers. Since integers
are real numbers, this would work with our implemen-
tation in solidity. This implementation also uses inte-
gers to compute the forward pass. With homomorphic
encryption, its possible to encrypt the data set for the
sake of privacy. (Zyskind et al., 2015) Its also possible
to encrypt the weights of a model that is trained on
an un-encrypted dataset. (Trask) One thing to keep
in mind is that even though homomorphic encryption
can provide anonymity, itll make the contract more
expensive to execute. For the scope of this paper, ho-
momorphic encryption is not included in the protocol.
6.2. Storage gas costs and alternatives
It is known that storing datasets in the contract and
validating them would require significant amounts of
gas.
Heres a solidity contract that writes 1 KB of data to
the ethereum blockchain on solidity version 0.4.19:
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.19;
2
3 contract StorageTest {
4 byte [1024] data;
5 function store () public {
6 for (uint i = 0; i < 1024; i++) {
7 data[i] = ’A’;
8 }
9 }
10 }
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After creating the contract, the transaction cost for
storing 1 KB of data is about 6068352 gas. This is
currently below the gas limit of 8 million (as of Jan
2018). This means that it is possible to write large
datasets in increments instead of a single transaction.
MNIST is a popular handwritten digits dataset used
for benchmarking optical character recognition algo-
rithms. The whole dataset is around 11594722 bytes.
(”Yann LeCun”) The average gas price is around 4
gwei (as of Jan 2018). This makes the total cost
of writing the MNIST dataset around 275 ethereum.
As of writing, ethereum is worth around $1,100 (Jan
2018). This would make the total cost about $302,500.
The gas price is mostly consistent across different so-
lidity versions for the same code instructions. The
total price can change over time, since its determined
by the gas and ethereum price.
A big portion of ML problems definitely have larger
datasets than MNIST. Storing these datasets in the
blockchain isnt a sustainable solution in majority of
cases.
Alternatives like IPFS and swarm might be used for
storing the datasets elsewhere. These alternatives try
to tackle the problem of storing large files and datasets
on the blockchain, while keeping the price at a reason-
able level.
6.3. Model execution timeout
Like with all other ethereum contracts, theres always a
gas limit for running DanKu contracts. Some complex
models may not run due to high gas costs. Miners
might reject these models if it requires gas more than
the limit imposed by the miner. Accepting to execute
such a model would make mining a block more likely
to become stale.
Even though the gas limit goes up on average, the
limit itself prevents running a set of deep neural net-
works. This means that running certain models may
not be possible until the gas limit goes up, or EVM
gets further optimized.
6.4. Re-implementation of Offline Machine
Learning Libraries
Since solidity only works with integers, most popular
machine learning libraries wont work out-of-the-box
with these contracts. These libraries might need to
be adapted to work with integers instead of floating
points.
This might be possible if the activation functions are
linear and the weights and biases are integers.
6.5. Cancelling a contract
Organizers are allowed to cancel a contract and take
back their reward if they havent revealed their training
dataset yet.
7. Other Considerations and Ideas
7.1. GPU miner arbitrage
A consequence of creating this market is that there
will be a well defined price of GPU training for ma-
chine learning models. Crypto-currency mining also
uses GPUs in many cases. We can envision a world
where at any given moment, miners can choose to di-
rect their hardware to work on whichever workload is
more profitable: cryptocurrency mining, or machine
learning training.
GPU miners who choose to join these mining pools will
be joining these pools that will be managed by Data
Scientists. If that pool solves the contract, ideally the
reward will be divided between the Data Scientists who
manage the pool and the miners who provide the hard-
ware.
Additionally the way to verify proof-of-work is a lot
more simpler than in traditional cryptocurrency min-
ing. In a pool a submitted solution and its accuracy
can be considered the unit of work, which would make
it easier to assess the amount of work done by each
individual miner. Each unit of work can be easily as-
sessed via the evaluation function.
7.2. Self-improving AI systems
Furthermore, we envision a world where intelligent sys-
tems can use these contracts to improve their own ca-
pabilities, by requesting training on new problem do-
mains.
Since these contracts use cryptocurrencies to reward
participants, all interactions with these contracts are
digital, hence ideal for self-improving AI systems.
7.3. Raising Money for Computation Power
for Medical Research
DanKu contracts can also be used for medical research
purposes. This has the advantage of being able to
directly donate to the contract wallet address. This
removes the requirement for a middleman or trusting a
3rd party. As the reward gets bigger, itll attract more
participants to submit solutions to the given problem.
For example, a DanKu contract could be created for a
protein-folding problem, that might help with cancer
Page 9 of 11
Evaluating and Exchanging Machine Learning Models on the Ethereum Blockchain
research. This would create a new way to crowdsource
funds for medical research.
7.4. Potential improvements
Its worth mentioning that the DanKu protocol has a
lot of room for improvement. As mentioned before,
introducing homomorphic encryption would definitely
be a useful feature. Better designed DanKu contracts
could significantly reduce gas costs. (Chen et al., 2017)
The solidity language could introduce new features
that would make DanKu contracts faster and cheaper.
The ever increasing gas limit will make running certain
machine learning models possible that werent before.
Improvements in Machine Learning such as using 8-bit
integers will help further reduce gas costs for DanKu
contracts. (Jouppi et al., 2017)
And possibly, a new language specifically designed
for matrix multiplication for the ethereum blockchain
can significantly increase performance for DanKu con-
tracts.
8. Conclusion
The DanKu protocol is a byproduct of two emerging
technologies that are disrupting their respective fields.
It utilizes the anonymous and distributed nature of
smart contracts, and the intelligent problem solving
aspect of machine learning. It also introduces a new
method for crowdsourcing funds for computational re-
search.
The protocol helps users solicit machine learning mod-
els for a given fee. The protocol does not require trust
and works completely on a decentralized blockchain.
The protocol creates interesting opportunities like
GPU mining arbitrage, provides a more transparent
platform for raising money for things like medical re-
search, and introduces an automated self-improvement
system for AI agents.
It is expected that open-source ML models will sig-
nificantly benefits from this. We might see a sudden
rise of publicly available ML models available in the
open-source community.
The protocol will potentially create a new marketplace
where no middlemen is required. Itll further democ-
ratize machine learning models, and increase oppor-
tunity in acquiring these models. This new levelled
playing field should hopefully benefits both blockchain
technology and machine learning, as itll provide a more
efficient mean of obtaining machine learning models
and increase smart contract usage over time.
References
Buterin, Vitalik. A next-generation smart contract
and decentralized application platform. 2014.
Chen, Ting, Li, Xiaoqi, Luo, Xiapu, and Zhang, Xi-
aosong. Under-optimized smart contracts devour
your money. CoRR, abs/1703.03994, 2017. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.03994.
Chung, Joon Son, Senior, Andrew W., Vinyals, Oriol,
and Zisserman, Andrew. Lip reading sentences in
the wild. CoRR, abs/1611.05358, 2016. URL http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1611.05358.
Graepel, Thore, Lauter, Kristin, and Naehrig,
Michael. Ml confidential: Machine learning on en-
crypted data. In Kwon, Taekyoung, Lee, Mun-
Kyu, and Kwon, Daesung (eds.), Information Secu-
rity and Cryptology – ICISC 2012, pp. 1–21, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2013. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN
978-3-642-37682-5.
He, Kaiming, Zhang, Xiangyu, Ren, Shaoqing, and
Sun, Jian. Delving deep into rectifiers: Surpassing
human-level performance on imagenet classification.
CoRR, abs/1502.01852, 2015. URL http://arxiv.
org/abs/1502.01852.
Hornik, Kurt. Approximation capabilities of
multilayer feedforward networks. Neural Net-
works, 4(2):251 – 257, 1991. ISSN 0893-
6080. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0893-6080(91)
90009-T. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/089360809190009T.
Jouppi, Norman P., Young, Cliff, Patil, Nishant,
Patterson, David, Agrawal, Gaurav, Bajwa, Ra-
minder, Bates, Sarah, Bhatia, Suresh, Boden,
Nan, Borchers, Al, Boyle, Rick, Cantin, Pierre-
luc, Chao, Clifford, Clark, Chris, Coriell, Jeremy,
Daley, Mike, Dau, Matt, Dean, Jeffrey, Gelb,
Ben, Ghaemmaghami, Tara Vazir, Gottipati, Ra-
jendra, Gulland, William, Hagmann, Robert, Ho,
Richard C., Hogberg, Doug, Hu, John, Hundt,
Robert, Hurt, Dan, Ibarz, Julian, Jaffey, Aaron, Ja-
worski, Alek, Kaplan, Alexander, Khaitan, Harshit,
Koch, Andy, Kumar, Naveen, Lacy, Steve, Laudon,
James, Law, James, Le, Diemthu, Leary, Chris, Liu,
Zhuyuan, Lucke, Kyle, Lundin, Alan, MacKean,
Gordon, Maggiore, Adriana, Mahony, Maire, Miller,
Kieran, Nagarajan, Rahul, Narayanaswami, Ravi,
Ni, Ray, Nix, Kathy, Norrie, Thomas, Omernick,
Mark, Penukonda, Narayana, Phelps, Andy, Ross,
Jonathan, Salek, Amir, Samadiani, Emad, Severn,
Chris, Sizikov, Gregory, Snelham, Matthew, Souter,
Jed, Steinberg, Dan, Swing, Andy, Tan, Mercedes,
Page 10 of 11
Evaluating and Exchanging Machine Learning Models on the Ethereum Blockchain
Thorson, Gregory, Tian, Bo, Toma, Horia, Tuttle,
Erick, Vasudevan, Vijay, Walter, Richard, Wang,
Walter, Wilcox, Eric, and Yoon, Doe Hyun. In-
datacenter performance analysis of a tensor pro-
cessing unit. CoRR, abs/1704.04760, 2017. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.04760.
Krizhevsky, Alex, Sutskever, Ilya, and Hinton,
Geoffrey E. Imagenet classification with deep
convolutional neural networks. In Pereira, F.,
Burges, C. J. C., Bottou, L., and Weinberger, K. Q.
(eds.), Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 25, pp. 1097–1105. Curran Associates,
Inc., 2012. URL http://papers.nips.cc/paper/
4824-imagenet-classification-with-deep-convolutional-neural-networks.
pdf.
Silver, David, Huang, Aja, Maddison, Christopher J.,
Guez, Arthur, Sifre, Laurent, van den Driess-
che, George, Schrittwieser, Julian, Antonoglou,
Ioannis, Panneershelvam, Veda, Lanctot, Marc,
Dieleman, Sander, Grewe, Dominik, Nham, John,
Kalchbrenner, Nal, Sutskever, Ilya, Lillicrap, Tim-
othy, Leach, Madeleine, Kavukcuoglu, Koray,
Graepel, Thore, and Hassabis, Demis. Mas-
tering the game of go with deep neural net-
works and tree search. Nature, 529:484–503,
2016. URL http://www.nature.com/nature/
journal/v529/n7587/full/nature16961.html.
Trask, Andrew. Building safe ai. URL http://
iamtrask.github.io/2017/03/17/safe-ai/.
Weyand, Tobias, Kostrikov, Ilya, and Philbin, James.
Planet - photo geolocation with convolutional neural
networks. CoRR, abs/1602.05314, 2016. URL http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1602.05314.
Xiong, Wayne, Droppo, Jasha, Huang, Xuedong,
Seide, Frank, Seltzer, Mike, Stolcke, Andreas, Yu,
Dong, and Zweig, Geoffrey. Achieving human par-
ity in conversational speech recognition. CoRR,
abs/1610.05256, 2016. URL http://arxiv.org/
abs/1610.05256.
”Yann LeCun”, ”Corinna Cortes”, ”Christopher
J.C. Burges”. The mnist database of handwrit-
ten digits. URL http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/
mnist/.
Zyskind, Guy, Nathan, Oz, and Pentland, Alex.
Enigma: Decentralized computation platform with
guaranteed privacy. CoRR, abs/1506.03471, 2015.
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03471.
Page 11 of 11
